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3. Art Forms

Figal, Günter Indiana University Press ePub

One is acquainted in general with the forms in which art shows and shows itself. One encounters them along with artworks, and they seem tangible inasmuch as artworks fit into various genres. These allocations happen as if on their own. They arise as soon as one speaks and reflects about artworks. One can only determine what artworks are in any detailed sense by allocating them to a form. By calling a work a poetic piece, an image, or a piece of music, one is giving a formal designation.

It is easy to see that these genre designations are fairly unspecific. They can be further differentiated and supplemented by other designations. With differentiation in mind, instead of speaking of poetic works in a general sense, one would distinguish stories, poems, and plays. An image can be a painting, a drawing, or a photograph; a piece of music is a song, a symphony, an opera. In terms of supplementation, one would have to take sculpture, buildings, dance, and even tea bowls into consideration.

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1. Philosophy, the Cross, and Human Being

Brian Gregor Indiana University Press ePub

Sustained by philosophy, religion receives its justification from thinking consciousness.

—G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

Justifying religious faith through thinking consciousness: this is arguably the highest aspiration of the philosophy of religion. Whether this aspiration is itself justifiable, however, is another question. Can religious faith be grasped and grounded, so that its content is justified by the necessity of the philosophical concept? Does religious faith have its telos in philosophical consummation? Or does there remain some residual opacity that philosophy cannot penetrate, some otherness that philosophy cannot reconcile within its own conceptual scheme? How should philosophy approach a reality that claims to be an irresolvable scandal for philosophical thinking?

This book explores that question with regard to a specific problematic—namely, whether philosophy can think the cross of Jesus Christ, which is central to Christian faith as both a historical event and a fundamental figure of Christian discourse. The cross poses a unique challenge—according to the apostle Paul, a scandal—for philosophical wisdom, and during the course of this study we will encounter several cases of philosophical engagement with the cross: in Hegel, for whom the cross is pivotal in the historical development of Spirit; in Nietzsche, who sees the cross as nihilistic, as a curse on human life, strength, and flourishing; in Heidegger, for whom the cross provides an ontic model for the Destruktion of the history of metaphysics; and in Ricoeur, who interprets the death of Jesus on the cross as a triumph of life and love over death, as an ethical transfer of love to the lives of his followers. The question, however, is whether these philosophical interpretations preserve the true scandal and offense of the cross, or whether something crucial is lost in them. Our task will be to consider how philosophical thinking can face the cross honestly, so that it is transformed by the cross rather than transforming the cross in order to fit its philosophical agenda. We are investigating, in order words, the possibility of an authentically cruciform philosophy.

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4. Theopoetics as the Insistence of a Radical Theology

John D. Caputo Indiana University Press ePub

 

 

I mean, brothers and sisters, the appointed time has grown short;
from now on, let even those who have wives be as though they had none,
and those who mourn as though they were not mourning,
and those who rejoice as though they were not rejoicing,
and those who buy as though they had no possessions,
and those who deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it.
For the present form of this world is passing away
.

—1 CORINTHIANS 7:29–31

At the end of his 1920–21 lecture course on the letters of St. Paul, the young Heidegger wrote:

Real philosophy of religion arises not from preconceived concepts of philosophy and religion. Rather, the possibility of its philosophical understanding arises out of a certain religiosity—for us, the Christian religiosity.1

We cannot start with a stable concept of “philosophy” and a stable concept of “religion” and then “apply” “philosophy” to “religion.” We must allow what are called “philosophy” and “religion” to tremble together under the force of their mutual contact, letting each push back on the other. That contact can be made not in the abstract, but rather from out of the original sources of the experience of “religiosity,” out of the concrete experience of the religious traditions. Heidegger continues:

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18. Boolian Algebra. First Lection

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF

18

Boolian Algebra. First Lection c. 1890

Houghton Library

§1. INTRODUCTORY

The algebra of logic (which must be reckoned among man’s precious possessions for that it illuminates the tangled paths of thought) was given to the world in 1842; and George Boole is the name, an honoured one upon other accounts in the mathematical world, of the mortal upon whom this inspiration descended. Although there had been some previous attempts in the same direction, Boole’s idea by no means grew from what other men had conceived, but, as truly as any mental product may, sprang from the brain of genius, motherless. You shall be told, before we leave this subject, precisely what Boole’s original algebra was; it has, however, been improved and extended by the labors of other logicians, not in England alone, but also in France, in

Germany, and in our own borders; and it is to one of the modified systems which have so been produced that I shall first introduce you, and shall for the most part adhere. The whole apparatus of this algebra is somewhat extensive. You must not suppose that you are getting it all in the first, the second, or the third lection. But the subject-matter shall be so arranged that you may from the outset make some use of the notation described, and even apply it to the solution of problems.

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10. The Maxim of Pragmatism (Lecture I)

Edited by the Peirce Edition Project Indiana University Press ePub

 

MS 301. [Published in CP 5.14–40 and in HL 104–21. This lecture, delivered on 26 March 1903, was left untitled.] This is the first in a series of seven lectures, delivered at Harvard from March through May, 1903, in which Peirce sought to build a case for pragmatism by examining its pros and cons. He also wanted to distinguish his pragmatism from other, more popular, versions. These are the lectures that William James characterized as “flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness!” In Lecture I, Peirce considers the utility of the pragmatic maxim and claims that its usefulness does not constitute a proof of its truth — it must pass “through the fire of drastic analysis.Peirce outlines the steps he will take to support his version of pragmatism. He rejects his earlier appeal to facts of psychology and points out that if pragmatism teaches that what we think is to be understood in terms of what we are prepared to do, then the doctrine of how we ought to think (logic) must be a branch of the doctrine of what we deliberately choose to do (ethics). But what we choose to do depends on what we are prepared to admire, which brings us to esthetics. An examination of pragmatism, therefore, involves all three of the normative sciences: logic, ethics, and esthetics. But first we must consider phenomenology, the science that deals with phenomena objectively and isolates the universal categories that pervade all our experience.

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