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Introduction: Monotheism of Reason and the Heart, Polytheism of the Imagination and Art

Peter Wake Indiana University Press ePub


Monotheism of Reason and the Heart, Polytheism of the Imagination and Art

The following study addresses what I will call G. W. F. Hegel’s early theologico-political writings. It focuses primarily on a series of unpublished, fragmentary works that Hegel produced while living in Bern (1793–1796) and Frankfurt (1797–1800). I will, however, make no attempt to engage these early writings as if the later system did not exist. Indeed, one of the aims of revisiting them is to read parts of Hegel’s later systematic texts through the earlier ones with the hope of capturing a spirit of engagement and an openness to future events that is too often concealed behind the still-lingering image of Hegel’s work as a triumphalist philosophy of historical progress, a totalitarian theory of the Absolute, and the last stand of the onto-theological tradition.1 Hegel’s early thought amounts to a thoroughgoing challenge to religious dogmatism and a rejection more specifically of the “positive” use of abstract, impersonal, metaphysical categories when conceiving of the divine. The force of Hegel’s challenge ought to give us pause before this persistent image of his work.

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3 Authority, Khilāfat, and the Lahori-Qadiani Split

Adil Hussain Khan Indiana University Press ePub

3  Authority, Khilāfat, and the Lahori-Qadiani Split

The Setting for the Split

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad passed away in the early morning hours of May 26, 1908, while visiting Lahore. His body was transported back to Qadian where Maulvi Hakim Nur al-Din, a close companion and disciple, led the funeral prayer after unanimously being chosen as Ghulam Ahmad’s successor by the Ahmadis participating in the procession. Although the events may have taken some time to unfold, the selection of Hakim Nur al-Din was not contested by the nearly 1,200 members in attendance, who offered him their bay῾at (allegiance).1 Nur al-Din had been the first person to take Ghulam Ahmad’s bay῾at in Ludhiana in 1889 and had always been regarded as one of Ghulam Ahmad’s most trusted friends. During his reign as khalīfa, Nur al-Din did little to assert his authority over the Jama῾at. His mild-mannered personality and strict adherence to Ghulam Ahmad left little room for objections. It was not until his own death six years later that the underlying differences within Jama῾at-i Ahmadiyya began to emerge.

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19. Notes on the Question on the Existence of anExternal World

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF


Notes on the Question of the

Existence of an External World c. 1890

Houghton Library

1. The idealistic argument turns upon the assumption that certain things are absolutely “present,” namely what we have in mind at the moment, and that nothing else can be immediately, that is, otherwise than inferentially known. When this is once granted, the idealist has no difficulty in showing that that external existence which we cannot know immediately we cannot know, at all. Some of the arguments used for this purpose are of little value, because they only go to show that our knowledge of an external world is fallible; now there is a world of difference between fallible knowledge and no knowledge. However, I think it would have to be admitted as a matter of logic that if we have no immediate perception of a non-ego, we can have no reason to admit the supposition of an existence so contrary to all experience as that would in that case be.

But what evidence is there that we can immediately know only what is “present” to the mind? The idealists generally treat this as self-evident; but, as Clifford jestingly says, “it is evident” is a phrase which only means “we do not know how to prove.” The proposition that we can immediately perceive only what is present seems to me parallel to that other vulgar prejudice that “a thing cannot act where it is not.” An opinion which can only defend itself by such a sounding phrase is pretty sure to be wrong. That a thing cannot act where it is not, is plainly an induction from ordinary experience which shows no forces except such as act through the resistance of materials, with the exception of gravity which, owing to its being the same for all bodies, does not appear in ordinary experience like a force. But further experience shows that attractions and repulsions are the universal types of forces.

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13. Organic Empathy: Feminism, Psychopharmaceuticals, and the Embodiment of Depression

Stacy Alaimo Indiana University Press ePub

Elizabeth A. Wilson

Judith Kegan Gardiner opened her 1995 review of Listening to Prozac, Talking Back to Prozac, and Prozac Nation for the journal Feminist Studies with this anecdote:

I recently attended an interdisciplinary feminist meeting that assumed a consensus about social constructionism and criticized scholarly work that was perceived as “essentialist,” because it implied a biological basis for gender attributes. During meals and breaks, however, I heard a different story. Several women were taking Prozac or similar drugs for depression. Some of their children, who had been difficult, “underachieving,” or disruptive in school, were also being medicated. These informal discussions centered on symptoms, side effects, and relief. They implied but did not discuss a view of personality as biochemically influenced. . . . The potential contradiction between such private solutions and the publicly avowed ideology of social constructionism was never voiced. (Gardiner 1995, 501–502)

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4. Raphael and Michael Angelo compared as men

Peirce, Charles S. Indiana University Press PDF


W R I T I N G S OF P E I R C E , 1857-1866

Thus, in their best days, Michael Angelo was old, Raphael young, and we can discern, by comparing them together that they have corresponding faults.

Michael Angelo, for instance, seemed (at this time1) to want self-Michael Angelo, for instance, seemed (at this time1) to want selfconfidence: he feared to undertake the painting of the Sistine Chapel, a task which I need not say he proved equal to. Raphael never would have hesitated in such a case; he erred the other way, a fact which we never should know, however, if he had not attempted to imitate

Michael Angelo. But observe how Michael Angelo in his old age is still young; he retains his vivacity, he retains his power, and when he can no longer hope to improve and sees himself outdone by a stripling, envy, which would seem almost inevitable, finds no place in his bosom.

Raphael, too, is old in his youth, which is very well proved by the fact that the heat of his temperament in nowise retarded the maturity of his mind.

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2 Limits of Agency: Notes on the Material Turn from a Systems-Theoretical Perspective

Serenella Iovino Indiana University Press ePub

Hannes Bergthaller

If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility—without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises—were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.

—Michel Foucault, The Order of Things

The buck stops here!

—Harry Truman

If one had to choose an epigraph for the new materialisms, one could do worse than settle for the closing lines of The Order of Things. The new materialist thought takes as a given the “crumbling” of the conceptual foundations of modern humanism that Foucault anticipated; its intellectual project is a redescription of the world that dissolves the singular figure of the human subject, distinguished by unique properties (soul, reason, mind, free will, or intentionality), into the dense web of material relations in which all beings are enmeshed. This move cuts two ways. On the one hand, the new materialists point out that human beings are far less sovereign than the humanist tradition would have us believe; on the other, they insist that matter is much more than the inert res extensa of old-style materialism, that it is endowed with many of the same qualities that were formerly seen as exclusive to human beings: complex self-organization, reflexivity, consciousness, and the capacity to act spontaneously, that is, in a manner not reducible to external determination. This insight can be summed up by saying that matter has agency. Agency, the new materialists argue, is emergent and distributed—that is, it is not the property of concrete, isolable entities, but manifests itself only as distributed throughout the networks in which these entities are embedded.

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II. The Text of the Lecture Course on the Basis of the Preserved Parts of the Handwritten Manuscript

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub




The purpose of this lecture course is to bring to understanding some basic concepts from out of the circle of Aristotelian research. More precisely, it is to give direction as to listening for what Aristotle has to say. And this direction is to be conveyed by way of our attempting listening in concrete examples.

Basic concepts: some. The selection is favorable: Metaphysics Δ: examples. Some of these and others: life, movement, knowledge, truth.

To examine which matters are meant in these concepts, how these matters are experienced, toward-which they are addressed and, accordingly, how they are expressed (significantly). Thus the full conceptuality as such: matters in the how and the how itself.

With the understanding of conceptuality there is to emerge insight and familiarity with the exigencies and possibilities of scientific research. Therefore a philosophy is not to be taught and learned. Accordingly, the purpose is not to render a portrait of Aristotle’s system nor to characterize the personality and the overall manner of the philosopher. No history of philosophy and philosophy of problems. Only to listen for what Aristotle perhaps has to say. If philology means the passion for knowledge of what has been spoken and of self-expression, then the purpose and procedure is purely philological.

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1. Eluding Capture: The Science, Culture, and Pleasure of Queer Animals

Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands Indiana University Press ePub


We’re Deer. We’re Queer. Get Used to It. A new exhibit in Norway outs the animal kingdom.

—Alisa Opar

Biological Exuberance is, above all, an affirmation of life’s vitality and infinite possibilities: a worldview that is at once primordial and futuristic, in which gender is kaleidoscopic, sexualities are multiple, and the categories of male and female are fluid and transmutable. A world, in short, exactly like the one we inhabit.

—Bruce Bagemihl

[W]e are acting with the best intentions in the world, we want to add reality to scientific objects, but, inevitably, through a sort of tragic bias, we seem always to be subtracting some bit from it. Like a clumsy waiter setting plates on a slanted table, every nice dish slides down and crashes on the ground. Why can we never discover the same stubbornness, the same solid realism by bringing out the obviously webby, “thingy” qualities of matters of concern?

—Bruno Latour

“Nature” and the “natural” have long been waged against homosexuals, as well as women, people of color, and indigenous peoples. Just as the pernicious histories of Social Darwinism, colonialism, primitivism, and other forms of scientifically infused racism have incited indispensable critiques of the intermingling of “race” and nature,1 much queer theory has bracketed, expelled, or distanced the volatile categories of nature and the natural, situating queer desire within an entirely social, and very human, habitat. This now compulsory sort of segregation of queer from nature is hardly appealing to those who seek queer green places, or, in other words, an environmentalism allied with gay affirmation, and a gay politics that is also environmentalist. Moreover, the question of whether nonhuman nature can be queer provokes larger questions within interdisciplinary theory regarding the relations between discourse and materiality, human and more-than-human worlds, as well as between cultural theory and science. In short, we need more robust, complex ways of productively engaging with materiality—ways that account for the diversity and “exuberance” of a multitude of naturecultures, ways that can engage with science as well as science studies. Queer animals—“matters of concern” for queer, green, human cultures—may foster such formulations.

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4: City and Soul

Sara Brill Indiana University Press ePub

THE MAJORITY OF the conversation that comprises the Republic occurs because Socrates is trapped by his own piety: unable to hear justice slandered, he agrees to defend the just life by showing the effects of justice and injustice on the soul. Glaucon and Adeimantus offer a number of formulations of this task. Glaucon desires to hear what the powers of justice and injustice are when they are in the soul, alone and by themselves, stripped of their wages and consequences (358b). Adeimantus, observing that no one has adequately argued that injustice is the greatest evil a soul can possess and justice, correspondingly, the greatest good (366e), fills in his brother's argument. He calls attention to the effect on the soul of the customary opinion that justice is good but hard, namely, the development of the belief that happiness is best attained by gaining the reputation for justice while cultivating the unscrupulous advantage-gaining of the unjust (365a–366b). He twice asks Socrates not only to show that justice is stronger than injustice, but also what each does to the person who has them (367b, e).1

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Introduction. The Subject Matter, Thesis, and Structure of This Study

Burt C. Hopkins Indiana University Press ePub


This study is concerned with the origination of the logic of symbolic mathematics as investigated by Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein. The ‘logic’ of symbolic mathematics at issue here is that which allows everyone—from barely literate school children to master mathematicians—to employ sense-perceptible letter signs, without a second thought, in a “mathematical” manner. The content of mathematics, like the content of its logic, is immaterial to its topic, which is how it has come about that such signs are self-evidently perceived to represent an “indeterminate” conceptual content as readily and unproblematically as, for example, the perception of the color and shape of this book.

What is responsible for this topic is uncontroversially referred to as ‘formalization’. What formalization is, however, is controversial. At one extreme, formalization is understood as the employment of letter signs or other marks to, at the very least, “stand for” or “symbolize” any arbitrary object or content—“whatever”—belonging to a certain “domain.” Let ‘3’ stand for the number of any arbitrary objects whatever; let ‘X’ stand for any arbitrary number whatever; let ‘S’ stand for any arbitrary subject member of any proposition whatever—all these expressions are examples of formalization, and when “interpreted” in a manner that finds nothing especially problematic to speak of here, these examples illustrate pretty much all that is needed—or the minimum needed—to begin formalization. At the other extreme is the view that formalization is the fulcrum for an unprecedented transformation in how the science of the so-called West forms its concepts, a transformation that is as all-encompassing as it is invisible to this day—especially to those who study the history of this science or are engaged in scientific inquiry.

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3. Acknowledging God

Espen Dahl Indiana University Press ePub

Having presented Cavell’s openness toward the problem of religion, I now proceed to more theologically charged territory in order to explore some possibilities offered by Cavell’s philosophy. In doing so, I focus on one of Cavell’s signature concepts, namely acknowledgment. Although acknowledgment has a wide application in Cavell’s thinking—including our relation to the world, others, different modernist artistic media, and our own conditions as speaking animals—it was initially developed in response to the skeptical problem of other minds. Since the problem of other minds has remained at the center of Cavell’s concerns, and since this problem highlights features relevant to related inflections of that concept, I first outline acknowledgment as it is developed in that context. To be precise, it is within the context of a discussion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument that Cavell first proposes this concept. In addition to its centrality to Cavell’s thinking on the whole, the reason for focusing on this concept in the present chapter is that it has clear implications for the conception of the self’s relation to God.

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Chapter 1: The Being-There of Human Beings as the Indigenous Character of Conceptuality

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

The consideration of the being-there of human beings as being-in-the-world has been brought to a certain conclusion. This being-in-the-world has the basic character of its being in λóγος. Λóγος pervades being-in. What is preserved in λóγος is the manner and mode in which the world and the being-there that is itself discovered therein are opened up. Λóγος disposes over the particular discoveredness and openedness of the world. It allows us the directions in which being-there can interrogate the world and itself.

Toward what purpose did the interrogating of the world and of the being-there of the human beings in it strive? It was examined with respect to the indigenous character of conceptuality, specifically with the purpose of understanding conceptuality itself. And that because only in conceptuality is every concept to be understood as what it is. Insofar as conceptuality is understood, the guiding clue to seeing concrete concepts is given. It had the purpose of setting forth basic concepts, of making conceptuality visible, and appropriating it for the understanding thereof. It sought conceptuality where conceptuality itself is at home and as such, from where it arises: that being in which something like conceptuality can be. With the emphasis on the indigenous character of conceptuality—on its indigenous Greek character—we have fulfilled a task that is placed before every interpretation, insofar as interpretation needs to be oriented by that of which it speaks.

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V Reminding

Edward S. Casey Indiana University Press ePub

There is an active and aktuall Knowledge in a man, of which these outward Objects are rather the re-minders than the first Begetters or Implanters.

—Henry More, 1653



The very multiplicity of the mental that has been operative in Part One threatens us with a special form of forgetfulness. We have witnessed a proliferation of types and subtypes, of primary and secondary traits, which brings with it the distinct danger that the overall shape of remembering will become lost in the minute traces of detailed descriptions. In facing this danger of descriptive immersion, it is advantageous to consider a mnemonic mode that is concerned specifically with the limits of memory. Reminders are expressly designed to draw us back from the edge of oblivion by directing us to that which we might otherwise forget. As reminding by its very nature delimits forgetting by constraining and diverting the waters of Lethe, so our consideration of reminding itself may help to delimit the present inquiry and to rescue it from submersion in an ocean of descriptive detail.

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Chapter Thirty-six. Conclusion

Burt C. Hopkins Indiana University Press ePub

By situating the historical-epistemological project of recovering the origin of the mathematical sciences proposed in Husserl’s Crisis within his own recovery of its origin in Origin of Algebra, Klein makes the strong case that Husserl’s phenomenology nevertheless does indeed possess the methodological resources for investigating the guiding “presupposition” of its account of the origin of the logic of symbolic mathematics. Husserl’s presupposition, of course, is that the true object of the formal mathesis universalis—the formalized concept of the ‘anything whatever’—is irreducible to its method of calculating symbolically. These resources are found both in Husserl’s programmatic articulation of the phenomenological task of investigating the genesis of formalized meaning in Formal and Transcendental Logic and in his fragmentary de-sedimentation of the formalizing mathematization of the life-world in the Crisis. We have shown that, as a result of the programmatic nature of the former and the fragmentary character of the latter, Husserl’s own employment of these resources does not sufficiently address the presupposition in question. His analyses in Formal and Transcendental Logic do not take up the phenomenological problem of the genesis of the method of symbolic calculating, and those in the Crisis do not desediment the phenomenological meaning of the historical origin of this method in François Vieta’s establishment of algebra.

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Chapter Two Theaetetus’s Answers to the Question of the Essence of Knowledge and their Rejection

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

T στιν πιστμη? This is the guiding question of the dialogue Theaetetus. The first answer runs: πιστμη = ασθησις, to know is to perceive, is perception. This answer will be rejected later on, but initially we will ask why precisely this answer is given and why this answer is given as the first.

We may make the assumption that in the dialogues the interlocutors do not babble randomly back and forth. Rather, the sequence of the discussion unfolds on the grounds of an originary understanding and speaking with one another.

Why precisely this answer? One can of course recall something from psychology textbooks: perception (ασθησις) is the lower cognitive capacity as compared to a higher one. But this is not what the conversation is about, nor is it a question of Plato’s wanting to refute Protagoras and perceptual relativism. His goal is not to refute but to exhibit the matter at hand.

The ground [for the first answer] in Plato’s text is more essential and deeper: it lies in the relationship between what πιστμη is in fact and what ασθησις means for the Greeks. We can recognize that this answer is not arbitrary from the fact that Aristotle, when he wants to designate the highest kind of knowing, νος, designates this apprehending as ασθησς τις [a kind of perception]. By this, he does not mean that somehow the essential relations of mores or of all the historicity of Being can be smelled with the nose or heard with the ears. Instead, ασθησις in its proper meaning as perceiving is taken up first as the essence of knowing, spontaneously as it were, because for the Greeks, perceiving and being perceived mean the same thing as ϕανεται: to say that this shows itself, something shows itself, is the same as saying that something is perceived.

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