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Afterword of the Editors of the Lecture Course Winter Semester 1920–21

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

Afterword of the Editors of the Lecture Course Winter Semester 1920–21

Martin Heidegger held the lecture course “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” as a private lecturer in the winter semester 1920–1921 at the University of Freiburg. According to the schedule of courses, it was held Tuesdays and Fridays from noon to one o'clock. It began on October 29, 1920; the last class was held on February 25, 1921. This is what it says in the dating of the postscripts.

The manuscript of the lecture course is lost. Even an announcement by the manager of the Nachlass in several wide-circulating newspapers brought no hint of its location. Yet there are five sets of notations, which allow for the approximate reconstruction of the train of thought and articulation of the lecture course. Three of these notations (Oskar Becker, Helene Weiß, Franz-Josef Brecht) are found in the German Literary Archives of Marbach; two are kept in the Husserl Archive of Leuven. From the total notations it is clear that Heidegger's lecture course falls into two distinctly differentiated parts, which are separated by a caesura at the end of the lecture on November 30, 1920. In Oskar Becker's notations, which employ a separate pagination for each of the two parts, the end of the first part is marked by the following sentence: “Owing to uncalled-for objections [Einwänden Unberufener], broken off on the 30th of November, 1920.” A query addressed to the archive of the University of Freiburg could find no explanation of the sort of objections. Presumably through these Heidegger saw himself forced to proceed abruptly from the extensive “Methodological Introduction” to the “Phenomenological Explication of Concrete Religious Phenomena”—thus the title of the second part of the lecture course according to Becker. Becker's quite legible notation probably derives from stenographical notes which were immediately transcribed after each lecture. Even if he at times significantly simplified Heidegger's sentences, and, as a rule, shortened them as well as providing his own structure, his notations can serve, in regard to the first part of the lecture course, as a foundation for the preparation of the text. Becker's notes on the first part of the lecture course are complete; in the second part are missing the lectures given on December 10th, and those from the 10th to the 20th of February.

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Peirce, Charles S. Indiana University Press PDF


W R I T I N G S OF P E I R C E , 1857-1866

Lecture I

MS 94: February-March 1865

Though I ask your attention to one of the studies of the ancient

Trivium—a study therefore according both to etymology and long prejudice, trivial—I trust I need not at this day defend it from the charge of piddling. It is now pretty plain that though modern science has scorned the scholastic terminology it has either continued to employ or has been forced to relearn the ideas that terminology conveyed, having simply thrown away the advantage of exact expressions. Logic in itself, however, has never been contemned by profound minds. It was a particular scheme of logic and not the science itself against which Bacon protested (see Aphorism XI); hence, he proceeds at once to substitute for that scheme another of his own,—and that intended to be a strictly logical one as I shall hereafter show. In the same way the reform of

Ramus, the reform of Kant and all the reforms of science have been logical reforms. The Ramists sneered at the scholastics, the modern natural theorists sneer at both, and certain persons are now beginning to sneer at the natural theorists. Another reform seems to be coming: it is in the air. Several logical questions are already under discussion by scientific men. Naturalists are divided into two classes, more according to Lyell upon a logical question than anything else. An eminent mathem/aticjian has proposed a reform of the most important part of the theory of probabilities on logical grounds. And physicists ought not to feel too secure of the logical character of the hypothesis of impenetrability and its consequences which has already been attacked by men of high standing. On this account, I believe that there are not now many thoughtful men of science who will think that the investigation of the logical character of scientific reasoning is a needless or unimportant inquiry.

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12 At Sea

John Sallis Indiana University Press ePub


Dalmatian Coast



The ship set out from Trogir. It was a small ship carrying only a dozen passengers and manned by a crew of four. We were to be at sea for a week, remaining on the ship except for relatively brief evening visits to a few of the cities, towns, and other sites along the way. As the ship pulled out of the harbor and headed southeast along the coast of the mainland, its continual swaying and the loud splashing of the waves against its side offered a constant reminder that we were at sea. The sky was perfectly clear, and though it was late afternoon, the sun still felt very warm on my skin. Yet the air had by then grown cooler, and once we had set out, I could feel its cool dampness as it blew across my face.

At sea one is almost completely surrounded by the elements, more thoroughly amidst them than perhaps in any other setting. Open to the sky and to the light that is its gift, one is surrounded by the sea as one looks off to the high mountains of the coastline that can be seen through the slightly misty air. All are there – sky, sea, mist, wind, mountains, as well as the lines where they are conjoined, as the coastline joins land and sea; all are there, not just as things are present, but with a manifestness that touches all one’s senses and expands one’s very sense of nature. By contrast, when one is on land – except in very remote places – there are always in view things fabricated by humans as well as various other signs of human intervention in the natural world. And when traveling by air in a modern jetliner, one is almost entirely insulated from the elements; and in this setting vision is almost the only sense that remains receptive to them. But at sea, granted the technical, nautical supplement required by humans, there is little else but sea and the other elements around it. Not only can one’s vision be captivated by it, but also one hears the pounding of the waves, smells the briny presence of the water, feels the dampness of the sea on one’s skin. All the senses, each in its own way, open ecstatically to the sea and thus also to the sky, the air, the mountains, with which it elementally convenes.

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33. Excerpts from Letters to William James (1909)

Edited by the Peirce Edition Project Indiana University Press ePub


L 224 and William James Papers, Houghton Library. [The four excerpts below were written in 1909. The first comes from pp. 6-14 of a long letter Peirce began on 26 February but did not send (L 224:90–98, CP 8.177–85 with some omissions, and NEM 3:839–44). This unwieldy letter was replaced with two shorter ones sent on March 9 and 14. The second excerpt consists of pages 6-10 of the 14 March letter, partly published in CP 8.314. The third excerpt includes pages 19–22 of a letter sent on 1 April, and published in CP 8.315. The last extract consists of the first eight pages of a letter begun on Christmas day; NEM 3:867–71.] Peirce’s effort to establish a “commens” with James resulted in interesting and sometimes unusual presentations of his semiotic ideas. Nearly all of the technical terms of Peirce’s semiotics, including “sign,” are well worked over in these excerpts. Not surprisingly, Peirce makes sure to let James know that “the Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act.” In the final segment, Peirce outlines his “System of Logic,” a book on semiotics he was working on, and provides one of the last summary accounts of his theory. Among other things, we learn that “every conceivable thing is either a May-be, an Actual, or a Would-be.” Peirce admits that there may be more than ten trichotomies of signs, but his ten “exhibit all the distinctions that are generally required by logic.” In his discussion of “Critic,” Peirce describes the kind of warrant that applies to each of the three types of reasoning.

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6. Love’s Ontology: Ethics Beyond the Limits of Classical Science

Dorothea E. Olkowski Indiana University Press ePub

If we are willing to throw out space, we can keep time and the trade is worth it.

—Fotini Markopoulou

We concluded the previous chapter with a discussion of dynamical systems theory and made the claim that this is the structure exemplified by the Sartrean concept of being and nothingness. Let us continue this discussion by reference to the logical presuppositions of this same Sartrean concept. Being and nothingness rests on the law of noncontradiction, which claims that for any proposition, that proposition and its negation are never both true, only one may be true. It also seems to require the law of the excluded middle, namely, that for a given proposition and its negation, at least one must be true and they cannot both be true. This means, of course, that for Sartre, Being cannot be both some x and its negation, only one can be true and at least some position x is true until superseded by its negation. By negating the being that we have been, we declare the past to be false and the present to be true.

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4. Evil, Freedom, and Foreknowledge

Hugh J. McCann Indiana University Press ePub


The argument of the foregoing chapters is in line with what theists have traditionally claimed: that God is the creator of heaven and earth and all that they contain, and that whatever occurs in the universe does so under divine providence—that is, under God's sovereign guidance and control. But believers usually assert more than this. They hold that God governs creation as a loving father, working all things for good. Moreover, it is said, God is an absolutely perfect being. He is, first of all, omniscient or all-knowing: he knows of all truths that they are true and of all falsehoods that they are false, whether they pertain to the past, present or future. And God's knowledge does not change. Nothing is learned or forgotten with him; what he knows, he knows from eternity and infallibly. Second, God is omnipotent or all-powerful: that is, on the usual understanding, anything that is logically possible, he can do. Finally and perhaps most important, God is perfectly good in both will and achievement: in all circumstances he acts for the best, intending the best possible outcome, and his will is not thwarted. Given these suppositions, we can only expect that creation will be ordained to perfect good: that as creator God pitches his efforts, which none can resist, toward accomplishing the greatest good imaginable, and hence that the world in which we find ourselves is, as Leibniz put it, the best of all possible worlds.

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Chapter Thirty. The Separation of Logic from Symbolic Calculation in Husserl’s Later Works

Burt C. Hopkins Indiana University Press ePub

Husserl’s characterization in the Schröder review of the symbolic thinking operative in mathematics goes beyond his account in Philosophy of Arithmetic, and does so in a manner that is consistent with what he says about these matters in the “Introduction to the Logical Investigations” of 1913. The concept of an external logic that is applicable to “merely symbolic” thinking is totally absent from Philosophy of Arithmetic. The question of the logical foundation of signitively symbolic calculation is left unresolved at the conclusion of the latter work.63 More precisely, the question left unresolved there concerns which of the two actual number concepts operative in Husserl’s investigations—the cardinal number concept or the normative systematic number concept—the signitively symbolic number concepts64 “are the logically qualified stand-ins for” (PA, 272). The assumption behind the very way in which this question is posed, which presupposes that there is a logical relationship between signitively symbolic numbers and the number concepts for which they function as surrogates, is precisely what Husserl rules out in the Schröder review. His argument that the symbolic calculus, as an “external surrogate for deduction” (Schröder, 8/56), “is not its logic” (8/57) is decisive on this point. It is not its logic because it does not touch the “logical theory of deduction.” Strictly speaking, then, Husserl concludes in the Schröder review that the relationship between the symbolic calculus—logical or mathematical, on this point it makes no difference—and the actual thinking and concepts for which it is the surrogate is not logical. Therefore, in contrast to Philosophy of Arithmetic, “merely symbolic thinking” in the Schröder review is not the logically qualified stand-in for the thinking and concepts for which its rule-governed technique substitutes a calculation process, and it is not such because its “logic” is in effect external to the thinking and concepts for which it acts as a surrogate.

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7: Politics and Immortality

Sara Brill Indiana University Press ePub

BOOK 10 OPENS with Socrates's observation that their most recent comments have illustrated the correctness of their earlier critical assessment of poetry. He then levels a charge against the imitative arts as such: they “seem to maim the thought of those who hear them and do not as a remedy have the knowledge of how they really are” (595b). According to this assessment, the lovers of poetry1 are lovers of something that disfigures them, and moreover does so without announcing these effects. Indeed, it is precisely the lack of transparency regarding poetry's ontological status and effects, its lack of provision for knowledge of what it is and does, that Socrates attempts to remedy in the subsequent discussion of what mimēsis is. This is to say that book 10, which concludes with the myth of Er, begins with a call for a poetry that is able to account for itself, a dialectical and self-critiquing poetry.

Throughout the first half of book 10, Socrates's critique of poetry takes as its justification the tendency of poetry to foster2 one part of the soul to the detriment of others, even in the souls of the decent (605c). The figure he summons to illustrate this danger is that of a bereaved and decent father who, having lost his son, does battle with himself, struggling between a desire to deliberate and set his affairs aright, on the one hand, and a desire to indulge in lamentation, nourishing the part of him that wants to mourn, on the other (603e–604d). Even decent people, concludes Socrates, are tempted by the displays of lamentation in tragedy to luxuriate in mourning (605c–d).

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4 Meaning in the World of Spirit

Yang Guorong Indiana University Press ePub

CONDITIONED BY THE interrelation of human capacities with systems of norms, accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things constitutes human being’s basic way of being and mode of being. In the historical unfolding of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, the presentation of things and the directionality of intentions reciprocally interact; the world enters the realm of ideas through this interaction and henceforth becomes being with meaning. As noted earlier, the problem of meaning does not occur to the world in-itself; rather, the source of meaning lies in the historical process of one coming to know the world and oneself while transforming both oneself and the world. Originating from the being of humans and the being of the world, meaning is within and unfolds within humanized reality, but also emerges in the form of ideas. The former (humanizing reality) means that humans transform “Nature in-itself” into “Nature for-humans” through practical action, by means of which the world in-itself becomes being, which is impressed with the mark of human, and which embodies the ideal of human values. The latter (meaning in the form of ideas) is not only being that is known or understood, insofar as it also unfolds into different forms of the world of spirit in the process of being evaluated and being invested with senses of value.

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Medium 9780253009258

2. The Intentional Encounter with “the World”

ELODIE BOUBLIL Indiana University Press ePub


The Intentional Encounter with “the World”

Christine Daigle

IN HUMAN, ALL Too Human, Nietzsche begins his investigation by considering the human encounter with objects in the world.1 His approach to the problem is initially conducted via a critique of Kant’s philosophy in the first chapter, “Of First and Last Things.” The book, written for the free spirit—the one that is freed from all alienating metaphysical illusions—was written in the spirit of the Enlightenment and was dedicated to Voltaire, “one of the greatest liberators of the spirit.”2 However, being a liberating book and one for the free spirit (or one for the spirit to be freed) does not make Human, All Too Human a rejection of the quest for truth. Quite the contrary: the task for Nietzsche is to reject everything that, up until now, has passed as truth in order to uncover the true nature of the human, his place in the world, and the relation between the human being and the world. Nietzsche thus puts to work Kant’s call, “Sapere Aude!”—Dare to know—that Enlightenment call for the human being to stop relying on authority and to seek knowledge for oneself, using the power of one’s spirit. This appetite for knowledge, paired with the courage that is necessary for it, implies a critique and a questioning of the philosophical tradition.3

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Medium 9780253008541

1 Blunt Reading

Mark A. Tietjen Indiana University Press ePub

1 Blunt Reading

THERE IS LIKELY to be minimal disagreement over the claim that Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses and other religious writings like Works of Love and For Self-Examination function to edify the reader. If there is opposition to this claim, the burden rests on those who see other intentions on behalf of the author, and it is not my objective to anticipate such arguments here. More difficult to defend, but much more interesting, is the thesis that the pseudonymous writings share this edifying function. This is not to say that all the pseudonymous authors themselves aim to edify or that taken alone, a particular pseudonymous book is intended this way, but rather that Kierkegaard, through the pseudonyms, works toward this end.

In this chapter I will turn to the work of Roger Poole, whose primary interest is Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship. Poole’s interpretation of the pseudonymous literature and his correlative advice for reading it represent the view of a growing number of scholars who approach Kierkegaard’s writings primarily from a literary perspective. Central to Poole’s reading is the idea that the views found in the pseudonymous literature are ultimately “undecidable” and that one cannot justly discern a common theme or purpose on the part of Kierkegaard. As Pattison puts it, “Roger Poole has asserted that Kierkegaard’s multiple pseudonyms are fundamentally distinct voices whose various points of view cannot be harmonised but, following Kierkegaard’s own stated ‘wish’ and ‘prayer,’ must be kept forever apart.”1 Entailed by Poole’s position (and claimed explicitly, although in a more caustic way) is that readings that affirm edifying interests on the part of Kierkegaard are misguided. Poole seems closed to the possibility that one might address seriously the pseudonymous texts in ways that credit the ethical, religious, edifying, and clarifying aims many commentators see in the authorship.

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1. Arthur Danto and the Problem of Beauty

PEG Z BRAND Indiana University Press ePub


Arthur Danto’s The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art is Danto’s most recent, through-written monograph on the philosophy of art. An obvious question occasioned by its publication is: what is it intended to add to Danto’s previous treatises on the philosophy of art, such as The Transfiguration of the Commonplace and After the End of Art? The simple answer, of course, is beauty. But, why, one asks, does Danto need to address beauty?1

I suspect that Danto has at least three motives for addressing the issue of beauty. The first is maybe the most proximate, but the least important. During the late 1990s, the artworld, where Danto presided as a leading critic, was abuzz with talk of beauty and its imminent rehabilitation. Second, the renewed respectability of beauty reminded philosophers that beauty and art had, it seemed, until the nineteenth century gone together like a horse and carriage. So, should not a complete philosophy of art have something to say about what they were doing together all that time?

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Medium 9780253016126

5. Memory, the Powers of the False, and Becoming

Marcia Landy Indiana University Press ePub

History progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, but by deciding problems and affirming differences. It is no less bloody and brutal as a result. Only the shadows of history live by negation: the good enter into it with all the power of a posited differential or a difference affirmed; they repel shadows into the shadows, and deny only as the consequence of a primary positivity and affirmation.

—Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (1994, 268)

COUNTER-HISTORY OVERTURNS classical conceptions of thought and practice by substituting for them a dynamic conception of connections between the body and social existence. In Deleuze’s singly authored texts, he elaborated on a philosophy of difference that he finds affirmed through the writings of Spinoza that have implications for thinking counter-historically through the powers of the false. According to Deleuze, “Life is poisoned by the categories of Good and Evil, of blame and merit, of sin and redemption. . . . Before Nietzsche, he [Spinoza] denounces all the falsifications of life, all the values in the name of which we disparage life” (Deleuze 1988a, 26). Deleuze’s engagement with these philosophers reveals how consistently he evolved concepts of affect, movement and time, virtual and actual space, and of relations between the true and the false by creating an ethic for thinking productively about becoming in the world through the body. Spinoza’s writings on affect and power offer a “philosophy of ‘life’” through which Deleuze explores the active and reactive powers of the body: its “capacity to affect is manifested as a power of acting insofar as it is assumed to be filled by passions” (ibid., 27, italics in original). According to him, when “we encounter a body that does not enter into composition with own . . . our power of acting is diminished or blocked, and that the corresponding passions are those of sadness” (ibid.). Deleuze further asserts that “only joy is worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near to action and to the bliss of action” (ibid., 28). Joy is “inseparable from the creation of new modes of social existence” (Goodchild 1996, 41). Deleuze distinguishes between active and reactive forces. Becoming-active “presupposes the affinity of action and affirmation,” whereas “reactive-force is negating and nihilistic” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987 68). New modes of thinking emerge that “provoke undecidable alternatives and inexplicable differences between the true and the false as adequate to time” (Deleuze 1989a, 132).

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VI. The event

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub



The event and the beginning.

The event and the human being.

Here, in the essential occurrence of the event, the uniqueness of the distinctive character of the human being must be experienced.

In this experience, knowledge of Da-seyn arises. (Da-sein is the essential occurrence of the clearing, the appropriation of the inceptual truth into which the human being is consigned.)

The event and the turning.

The turning essentially occurs in the event.


The turning itself is the essence of “beyng.”

The event and the inceptual “that it is” of the inceptuality.

“The fact that being is” and with it nothingness—what does the “that it is” mean? The “that it is” of horror, bliss, pain;

the “that it is” of the distinction within the difference.

The event and uniqueness (the truth of the ἕν).

The event and beinglessness.

The event and the dispropriation.

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9. Life-Narrative and Death as the End of Freedom: Kierkegaard on Anticipatory Resoluteness

Indiana University Press ePub


John J. Davenport

In three recent articles, John Lippitt has raised important questions about the notions that human selves have a “narrative” structure and that the natural development of our capacity for robust selves (including autonomy and ethical maturity) involves achieving “narrative unity” in the stories that we are.1 His questions intersect with other critiques of narrative models raised in the wider and growing literature on this topic in the past decade. Lippitt forces us to reconsider claims that Anthony Rudd, I, and others made in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre that MacIntyre’s famous account of narrative unity as part of the telos of human life2 sheds light on Kierkegaard’s conception of selfhood, and that insights from Kierkegaard can help us develop and defend such a narrative model. In particular, Lippitt questions whether narrative is a useful model for real human lives, and whether movement from the “aesthetic” to the “ethical” outlook or stage of life is illuminated by the idea of narrative unity.

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