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V. The Grounding

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

Grounding

Da-sein

Truth

Time-space

Da-sein means appropriation in the event, the latter taken as the essence of beyng. Only on the ground of Da-sein, however, does beyng enter into truth.

Where plant, animal, stone, sea, and sky come to be, without descending into objectivity, there the withdrawal (refusal) of beyng is reigning, i.e., beyng is reigning as withdrawal. But the withdrawal is of Da-sein.

The abandonment by being is the first dawn of beyng as self-concealing out of the night of metaphysics, through which beings pressed forward into appearance and pressed forward objectivity, while beyng became an addendum in the form of the apriori.

Yet how abyssally cleared must the clearing for self-concealing be, such that the withdrawal might not appear superficially as mere nullity but might reign as bestowal.

The unrelenting strictness of the inner oscillation of Da-sein entails that Da-sein does not count the gods, does not count on them, and certainly does not reckon with an individual god.

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Chapter 3

Tony Grey John Libbey Publishing ePub

While the bridge crawls across the Euphrates, Marcus and Gaius Fulvius Aquila take a stroll to Zeugma. Never taken by education – uninterested in books, Gaius only ever wanted to join the army. He accepts that high rank is beyond him, content with being an ordinary centurion, practical and reliable. In the earthy twang of his youth, he often teases Marcus about his aspirations, especially the improved accent.

The two are life-long friends, unfazed by differences. Underneath, their values are the same, a moral linkage which allows each to admire the other’s qualities. Gaius is stronger, Marcus quicker. The big man has more of an earthy attitude to life, uncomplicated by the disappointments attending ambition. He’s a natural Stoic; Marcus works at it.

In a few minutes, another centurion in their cohort catches up with them, slightly out of breathe. Marcus says,

“Ave Quintus. You want to come with us for a drink?”

“Sure. I thought we were all going together.”

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13. Appearance and Values: Nietzsche and an Ethics of Life

ELODIE BOUBLIL Indiana University Press ePub

13

Appearance and Values

Nietzsche and an Ethics of Life

Lawrence J. Hatab

IF WE TAKE phenomenology in a general sense to be concerned with “appearance,” Nietzsche’s philosophy offers a wealth of pertinent material. Yet the meaning of appearance in Nietzsche’s texts is not always easy to fathom. In this chapter I want to explore a “phenomenology of values” by coordinating Nietzsche’s complex approach to appearance with his critique of morality.1

For Heidegger, Nietzsche represents the culmination of Western metaphysics and nihilism, particularly with his thinking on will to power and eternal recurrence. Presumably Nietzsche remains within the orbit of metaphysics by simply reversing metaphysical binaries (e.g., becoming over being, appearance over truth).2 Nevertheless I believe that Nietzsche’s philosophy, and especially his central concept of will to power, cannot be understood in this manner, and that his approach to appearance is not simply a reversal of traditional realism and models of truth. First of all, will to power is conceived specifically as a rejection of binary opposites, because it names a process of overcoming something, in which overcoming and otherness are structurally related to each other. Second, the meaning of “appearance” is complicated in Nietzsche’s thinking. Often he will use appearance as a rhetorical weapon against metaphysical conceptions, calling them “apparent” rather than “real.” At other times he will use appearance in a more positive sense to designate the way a world of becoming is given to us, as an “appearing” flux. He recognizes that a rejection of metaphysical “reality” also dismisses a deficient sense of “mere” appearance.3 This is the problem: Nietzsche is happy to bank on deficient senses of appearance (error, lie, fiction, etc.) to characterize human thinking as an ungrounded process of interpretation, but these senses cannot be taken in their traditional connotations because there are no “true” conditions by which we could measure them as “false.”

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14. A large number of repetitions of similar trials

Peirce, Charles S. Indiana University Press PDF
Medium 9780253013835

10 Verbis Indisciplinatis

CLAYTON SCOTT CROCKETT Indiana University Press ePub

Joseph Ballan

WHICHEVER CONTINENT, REAL or imagined, it is aligned with, philosophy of religion in the United States occupies a somewhat uneasy position alongside other disciplines and institutional arrangements. Scholars who work on or within Asian philosophical traditions find themselves facing much the same predicament as those who locate themselves somewhere within the vaguely post-phenomenological landscape called “Continental philosophy of religion.” To what disciplinary genus does this species of scholarship—which has also become a recognizable style of scholarship—belong? To philosophy? To religious studies? To theology? Perhaps to none of these options? In what follows, I would like to think about what this strange and perhaps uncomfortable distance from other modes of knowledge production might make possible. What kind of thought might be available precisely because of this lack of a proper home? To begin posing the question about what connects philosophy of religion to empirical approaches like sociology and anthropology, and to humanistic approaches like history and literary studies, what differentiates philosophy of religion from them, and what those connections and differentiations demand and entail for responsive and responsible scholarship, I appeal to Jacques Rancière’s concept of theoretical in-discipline.1 Before articulating exactly what indisciplinarity might mean, however, I shall sketch part of the background against which Rancière’s idea of indisciplinarity emerges, in order to suggest how it might be a fruitful challenge for scholars of religion to take up.

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Faces, Idols, Fetishes

Alphonso Lingis Indiana University Press ePub

modern epistemology set out to rigorously distinguish the real appearance of a thing from its perspectival deformations; its appearances in positions set askew or upside-down; obscured or confused appearances due to the poor lighting, the intervening medium, or the distance—to segregate the real appearances from illusory ones. Then it set out to demarcate the appearance given and perceived in a here-and-now presence from the traces of its appearance, retained by memory, of a moment before and from the anticipations of its appearance in a moment later. It set out to isolate the here-and-now given from the relationships between past, present, and surrounding appearances elaborated by the synthesizing operation of the sensibility that identifies something selfsame in a series of appearances extending across a span of time. This epistemology seeks to separate, in the multitude of appearances a thing extends in time and space, what is due to the reality of the thing from what is due to the intervening medium and what is due to the mind. It set out to inventory the pure data and to identify in the retinal imprints what is due to the thing itself.

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1 The Trouble with Intersex: History Lessons

Ellen K. Feder Indiana University Press ePub

In a Short talk he delivered in 2000 at the American Association for the History of Medicine, pediatric endocrinologist Jorge Daaboul reflected on the revelatory character of history in his own practice. He recounts that he had begun to have serious doubts about the standard of care that made imperative the surgical normalization of atypical genitalia in children. Though this was the standard in which he had been trained—in the tradition of Lawson Wilkins, the founder of pediatric endocrinology, and John Money, the preeminent psychologist of sexual difference—he began to pose to his colleagues the questions he had come to ask himself, namely, whether the standard was genuinely in the best interests of their young patients. The uniform responses to his questions, he told his audience in 2000, yielded two arguments in defense of the standard. First, “intersexed individuals,” his colleagues told him, “could not possibly live normal lives as intersexed individuals and . . . the only chance they had for happiness and psychological well being was the establishment of a secure male or female gender identity. Second, there simply was no precedent for [such individuals] living as normal people in our society” (Daaboul 2000).

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Appendix II Notes and drafts for the lecture course of Winter Semester 1933–1934

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

. . . ubi invenitur perfecta ratio veritatis [where we find the complete account of truth] (cf. quaest. I, art. 2). . . . per posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu [the true is found secondarily in things, but primarily in the intellect] (cf. ibid.). Relation to Aristotle, Metaphysics E 4! And: in intellectu divino (creans) mensurante, non mensurato [in the divine (creating) intellect that is measuring, not measured]. Pre-formation; intellectus humanus speculativus [the human theoretical intellect] is imitative; intellectus humanus practicus [the human practical intellect] is preformative or constructive in a certain way.

Why {primarily in the intellect}? Because veritas = adaequatio [truth = conformity] and Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus [for the definition of the true consists in the conformity of thing and intellect] (art. 3); {verum} aequalitas diversorum est [(the true) is an equality of diverse things] (ibid.), “equality” (as-similation).

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Coda

Edward S. Casey Indiana University Press ePub

There remain other, more deep-going differences between reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing. In part, these differences inhere in the peculiar medium of each mode. While reminding arises from the operation of various kinds of signs that constitute a specifically semiological medium, reminiscences favor words, that is, a distinctively verbal format: which is not to deny a significant overlap between the two media. Recognita, in contrast, occur in a (prototypically) perceptual context or else in an intrapsychic sphere, neither of which is strictly semiological or linguistic in status. Further, the three modes differ noticeably in their characteristic forms of temporality. We have seen that reminders send us either backward or forward in time—or both at once—while in reminiscing we are cast back into the past by virtue of reliving it. In recognizing, on the other hand, I am imbued with an irrescusable presentness and linked to the past only through its shadow in the present. Everywhere, then, differences abound among the mnemonic modes.

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35. On the Number of Dichotomous Divisions: A Problemin Permutations

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF

35

On the Number of Dichotomous

Divisions: A Problem in Permutations

Spring 1891

Houghton Library

In the calculus of logic, a proposition is separated by its copula, R, into two parts, as A R B. But these parts may again be separated in like manner, as (A R B ) R C and A R (B R C ), and so on indefinitely. It becomes pertinent to inquire how many such propositional forms with a given number of copulas there are. The same problem presents itself in general algebra, where R is replaced by any non-associative sign of operation; and, indeed, the question not unfrequently arises; but I do not know that the solution has been given.

We may consider a row of letters, A, B, C, etc., which we may call the ABC, separated into two parts by a punctuation mark, and each part

(not consisting of a single letter) into two parts by a subordinate punctuation mark, and so on until all the letters are separated. I shall call the resulting form an ABC-separation. The following are examples

A:B.C;D,E:F

A.B;C:D;E,F

Let n be the number of punctuations; then, the number of letters will be n ϩ 1. Let F n be the number of ABC-separations with n punctuations, or say of n-point separations. Then, if i be the number of letters to the left of the highest punctuation, so that n ϩ 1 Ϫ i is the number to the right, the number of ABC-separations of the row to the left is

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4. Raphael and Michael Angelo compared as men

Peirce, Charles S. Indiana University Press PDF

14

W R I T I N G S OF P E I R C E , 1857-1866

Thus, in their best days, Michael Angelo was old, Raphael young, and we can discern, by comparing them together that they have corresponding faults.

Michael Angelo, for instance, seemed (at this time1) to want self-Michael Angelo, for instance, seemed (at this time1) to want selfconfidence: he feared to undertake the painting of the Sistine Chapel, a task which I need not say he proved equal to. Raphael never would have hesitated in such a case; he erred the other way, a fact which we never should know, however, if he had not attempted to imitate

Michael Angelo. But observe how Michael Angelo in his old age is still young; he retains his vivacity, he retains his power, and when he can no longer hope to improve and sees himself outdone by a stripling, envy, which would seem almost inevitable, finds no place in his bosom.

Raphael, too, is old in his youth, which is very well proved by the fact that the heat of his temperament in nowise retarded the maturity of his mind.

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6 The Figure of Socrates and the Climacean Capacity of Paradoxical Reason

McCombs, Richard Indiana University Press ePub

 

I have said that ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most high. But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes. (Psalms 82:6)

 

That . . . ye might be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world. (2 Peter 1:4)

 

Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure. (2 Philippians 2:12–13)

 

A human being is a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, and of the temporal and the eternal. (CUP, 56, 92)

 

What a piece of work is man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties . . . in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god . . . and yet to me, what is this quintessence of dust? (Shakespeare, Hamlet)

Philosophical Fragments officially confines human beings within seemingly rigid limits,1 but it also suggests that the man Socrates transcends these limits. For example, Fragments claims that all non-Christians “move away” from the truth of Christianity, but it also intimates that Socrates longs for and prepares himself for the mystery of Christ. Bearing in mind that a climacus is a ladder,2 we might say that Fragments dramatically depicts Socrates as a climacean figure, or as a climber over boundaries and a transgressor of limits, and that the function of this depiction is to provoke readers to become aware of their own climacean capacity and to inspire them to use it. This present chapter is an explication of Kierkegaard’s artful use of the climacean figure of Socrates in Philosophical Fragments.

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The Problem of Logical Subject-Matter from Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938)

LARRY A HICKMAN Indiana University Press ePub

Contemporary logical theory is marked by an apparent paradox. There is general agreement as to its proximate subject-matter. With respect to this proximate subject-matter no period shows a more confident advance. Its ultimate subject-matter, on the other hand, is involved in controversies which show little sign of abating. Proximate subject-matter is the domain of the relations of propositions to one another, such as affirmation-negation, inclusion-exclusion, particular-general, etc. No one doubts that the relations expressed by such words as is, is-not, if-then, only (none but), and, or, some-all, belong to the subject-matter of logic in a way so distinctive as to mark off a special field.

When, however, it is asked how and why the matters designated by these terms form the subject-matter of logic, dissension takes the place of consensus. Do they stand for pure forms, forms that have independent subsistence, or are the forms in question forms of subject-matter? If the latter, what is that of which they are forms, and what happens when subject-matter takes on logical form? How and why?

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3. Faith, Substance, and the Cross

Brian Gregor Indiana University Press ePub

In the previous chapter we discussed Charles Taylor’s claim that human beings are self-interpreting animals. As we saw, self-interpretation is a matter of strong evaluation, a second-order evaluation of oneself. Are my desires, goals, and commitments good? Am I living the way I should? Is it good that I “am”? We evaluate ourselves, in this strong sense, within a horizon of significance—i.e., a set of background assumptions regarding what is good, meaningful, and valuable. Moreover, this strong evaluation takes place before some authority. The category of “existence before” is therefore essential to becoming a self. I experience myself as responsible, answerable, accountable to some authority for who I am and what I do. This authority might be another self, a community, an institution; it might be a code or principle; it might be my own conscience. In this chapter, and for much of this book, our concern will be the category of existence before God (coram Deo). To begin, then, I offer a few remarks on why this category is the ultimate horizon of strong evaluation, and thus for becoming a self.

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4 Reproaching Heaven and Serving Heaven in the Mèngzǐ

Franklin Perkins Indiana University Press ePub

THE MÒZǏ AND Dàodéjīng both claim that we share common goals and that following the regular patterns of nature allows us to effectively reach them. In this sense, both can be seen as opposing the fatalism that developed near the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, restoring a model analogous to the early Zhōu doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. The disorder and suffering of the times, however, suggested that the fit between heaven and human was not so neat. Given the condition of the world, good people might not want to follow its patterns—they might even feel the need to oppose it. Although the Mòzǐ and Dàodéjīng at least aim toward the harmony or unity of heaven and human (tiānrén héyī), the conditions of the time pointed more toward recognizing their division (tiānrén zhīfēn). We have already seen the outlines of such a position in the fatalistic tendency among some of the early Ru. Mèngzǐ’s philosophy can be seen as a more complex and developed account of this position, primarily adding two dimensions. One is a detailed account of human motivation in terms of an analysis of xìng , our natural or characteristic tendencies and dispositions. The other is an attempt to shift the locus of our relationship with heaven away from the external patterns of nature and toward these natural dispositions that heaven gives us. Together, these two points allow Mèngzǐ to take the problem of evil more seriously than any other prominent Warring States philosopher, leaving him closest to something like a tragic worldview.

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